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Abstract Trustworthy eco-labels provide consumers with valuable information on environ-
mentally friendly products and thus promote green consumerism. But what makes an eco-
label trustworthy and what can government do to increase consumer confidence? The scant 
existing literature seems to argue that low governmental involvement increases confidence. 
According to this, government should just provide the basic legal framework for eco-labelling 
and leave the rest to non-governmental organizations. However, the empirical underpinning 
of this recommendation is insufficient. This paper analyses consumer confidence in different 
organic food labelling regimes with varying degrees of governmental involvement. Using 
unique and detailed survey data from USA, United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, the 
analysis shows that confidence is highest in countries with substantial state involvement. This 
suggests that governments can increase green consumerism through active and substantial in-
volvement in eco-labelling. 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Green economy’ is the new mantra in government. It is envisaged that efforts to combat 
global warming, lessen dependence on imported fossil fuel, and create new jobs can be com-
bined. Environmentally friendly goods that are produced domestically and are less energy 
consuming than traditionally produced products can help this vision materialize. Of course, 
government can spark such green production, for instance by subsidising research and devel-
opment, providing  production subsidies or through government procurement. However, 
unless demand in the market develops, such subsidized production is probably economically 
unsustainable and will create market distortions in the long term. Therefore, the vision of a 
green economy, as articulated by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean as well 
as in the literature on ecological modernization, relies on the assumption that consumers will 
actually demand climate and environmentally friendly products (Weale 1992: 31; Mol and 
Spaargaren 2000; Seyfang 2005). 
 
However, at least three conditions must be met before green consumerism will become wide-
spread. First, consumers must have a fairly high level of environmental awareness before they 
even consider buying environmental products.  Second,  they must be willing to act pro-
environmentally when making individual purchasing decisions, because green products are 
often more expensive than conventional products. Third, because of the price premium, con-
sumers must also possess sufficient information to ensure them that a good claiming to be en-
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vironmentally friendly actually fulfils this promise (Carter 2007, 232, Jordan et al. 2004, 163; 
Gertz 2005). 
 
While the institutional and attitudinal requisites for increasing environmental awareness and 
motivating pro-environmental behaviour have already been established in the literature (e.g., 
Inglehart 1997; Lubell 2002; Sønderskov 2008b), the question of credible information about 
products claiming to be produced in an environmentally friendly way is under-researched. 
This paper addresses this issue, focusing on what governments can do to advance the supply 
of credible information on green products. Eco-labelling, the labelling of environmentally 
friendly products, has been recognized as an effective way to provide easily accessible infor-
mation (Lohr 1998), but the extent to which eco-labels increase green consumption is highly 
dependent on their trustworthiness. Thus, a central question is how to ensure trustworthy la-
bels, and in this study we investigate whether consumers have more confidence in govern-
mental labelling schemes than in those operated by private organizations. 
 
The issue of trustworthiness figures prominently in the literature on eco-labelling (e.g., Bo-
ström 2006a; Boström and Klintman 2008; Nilsson et al. 2004; Thøgersen 2000), but very 
little attention has been paid to actual consumer confidence in the labelling schemes. Existing 
studies are more concerned with analysing the way labelling and standard setting processes, in 
particular inclusiveness, affect trust in the labelling scheme. Rather than establishing con-
sumer confidence directly, these studies use stakeholder organizations’ statements or assess-
ments as an indicator for trust in the labelling scheme (e.g. Nilsson et al. 2004; Boström 
2006b; Boström and Klintman 2008). Obviously, consumer confidence, and not trust among 
stakeholders in the standardization process, is the crucial driving force behind green consum-
erism. In relation to the discussion of the role of the state in the green economy a question of 
particular interest is how different degrees of governmental involvement in eco-labelling ac-
tually affect consumer confidence. A few studies have addressed consumer confidence and 
the role of government, but not in any detail (e.g., Boström & Klintman 2006). In studies by 
Gertz (2005) and by Ward et al. (2004) consumers were asked which type of certification and 
labelling body (governmental or private) they would trust most in handling an eco-labelling 
scheme. These analyses found that consumers preferred environmental or consumer organiza-
tions over governmental organizations. However, respondents were asked to choose between 
hypothetical alternatives that they had not necessarily experienced. 
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Thus, very little thorough research exists on how the design of eco-labelling schemes affects 
consumer confidence. This issue is crucial in designing schemes which have the potential to 
contribute to the emergence of a green economy. Hence, this study compares the level of con-
sumer confidence in different existing schemes rather than hypothetical ones to generate in-
sights into the factors that affect consumer confidence in eco-labelling. As our case, we com-
pare confidence in organic food labels in Sweden, Denmark, the UK and the US. These coun-
tries were chosen because they operate certification and labelling systems with varying de-
grees of governmental involvement. Based on a cross-national survey designed for this pur-
pose, we explore how varying degrees of governmental involvement affect confidence, while 
controlling for several  alternate explanations.  In contrast to the few previous studies,  our 
analysis shows that schemes relying on heavy governmental involvement attract more confi-
dence than schemes with less state involvement. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the following section reviews the sparse literature on the role 
of government in eco-labelling and discusses two alternate views on the effects of govern-
mental involvement on consumer confidence. The subsequent empirical section outlines the 
organic labelling schemes in the four countries. The balance of the paper compares the level 
of consumer confidence, accounts for the research methods applied to establish the impact of 
government involvement on consumer confidence and undertakes a regression analysis to ex-
plain the observed cross-national pattern, considering a number of alternative explanations. 
The last section concludes and attempts to distil the lessons learned for policy makers. 
 
Theoretical considerations on third party verification and consumer confidence 
Green consumption is often associated with higher consumer prices and information asymme-
try between producers, retailers and consumers. In most cases, it is impossible to tell by ap-
pearance if a product has been produced in an environmentally friendly way, even after pur-
chase. Producers and/or retailers who exploit the information asymmetry and provide false 
information about their products can increase profit and/or sell their products at a lower price 
than honest competitors. Without an institutional set-up which can guarantee to consumers 
that producers are complying with certain environmental production standards, prospective 
green consumers face a problem of adverse selection. Without credible and easily accessible 
information, supply of true environmentally friendly goods will be at lower levels than other-
wise, which hampers green consumerism—as in Akerlof’s classic example from the used car 
market (Akerlof l970; Caswell & Mojduszka 1996). 
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Eco-labelling is a way to provide consumers with credible and easily accessible information 
on the environmental attributes of a product. Eco-labelling is based upon ‘standardization of 
principles and prescriptive criteria’ (Boström and Klintman 2008, 28) for environmentally 
friendly products and serves the purpose of differentiating the product from other products 
and of ensuring consumers that a product is produced in accordance with the standards. Under 
eco-labelling schemes producers are usually, but not always, licensed by an independent third 
party which also audits whether producers comply with the standards laid down by the label-
ling scheme (Jordan et al. 2005, 482; Boström and Klintman 2008, 28).
1
 
 This third party can 
be a private organization or in some instances a state agency. State  engagement in eco-
labelling is most intensive where the state sets the standards, certifies products and producers, 
and very marginal when these functions are left to private organizations. In the latter situation, 
the minimal role of the state is to recognize the label, or at least not reject it (see Hysing 
2009). This recognition can, for instance, be demonstrated in the government’s purchasing 
decisions. The state may also play a more indirect role as standard setter and authorizer of 
private certification and inspection bodies. 
Some degree of state support is important for the broader legitimacy of labelling schemes and 
the trust of consumers, but it is not evident in the eco-labelling literature to what extent the 
state should become involved to optimize legitimacy and trust. This question links up with a 
broader discussion in the literature on environmental governance about the extent to which 
state involvement is required in the successful application of new environmental policy in-
struments (NEPIs), of which eco-labelling is one example. For instance Jordan et al. (2005) 
find that NEPIs are rarely applied without some sort of state involvement. Focusing on eco-
labelling Boström (2006a, 153) shares this view, arguing that: 
 
Any type of regulation and governance relies on legitimacy, but new regulatory ar-
rangements that are built on non-state horizontal relationships have structural draw-
back. They cannot rely on traditional enforcement capacities and they have, by defini-
tion, cut themselves off from the political system of representative democracy which 
                                                 
1 However, there are also eco-labelling schemes with second and first party certification. The labelling scheme is 
organised by an industry association in the former and by the producer in the latter (Boström 2006a, 141). 
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have long been assumed to be the ultimate source of policy- and rule-making legiti-
macy and authority.  
 
As for a fairly complicated issue like green production, people may be more inclined to trust 
information provided by government institutions than by private organizations. They may be-
lieve that the former possess higher expertise on the issue than the latter because information 
about environmental and public health issues is usually provided by government institutions. 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the state’s takeover of organic labelling in Denmark 
successfully increased consumer confidence (e.g. Hofer 2000). 
 
However, other authors seem to argue that the state should only play a minimal role in eco-
labelling. For instance, Boström and Klintman (2006) and Lilliston and Cummins (1998) ar-
gue that the involvement of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) may have 
watered down the US state organic standards and triggered scepticism within the organic 
movement. Boström and Klintman (2006) compare the American state-centred scheme with 
the Swedish scheme and conclude that the Swedish scheme attracts more consumer confi-
dence because of substantial involvement of non-governmental organizations  in Sweden. 
However, they do not consider alternate explanations for the varying levels of consumer con-
fidence. Gertz (2005) reports lower consumer confidence in government labels in Europe, 
while Ward et al. (2004) cannot find lower confidence in government labels among Ameri-
cans (in Utah). Despite limited research on this matter, the sparse evidence—or at least the 
common assumption—seems to suggest that labelling should be handled by independent or-
ganizations rather than the state. This corresponds to the line of reasoning in much of the lit-
erature on joint environmental policy making (e.g. Mol et al. 2000). If government involve-
ment is limited to providing the basic framework, the polluting actors can, in some cases, de-
velop mutual trust, and cooperation on pollution abatement will result (see e.g. Enevoldsen 
2000). 
 
In sum, the literature offers two alternate views on the optimal role of the state. Taking or-
ganic food labelling as an example, we analyse whether substantial state engagement in eco-
labelling affects consumer confidence. Organic labelling systems are organized in various 
ways across countries which makes them particularly well suited for exploring how this vari-
ance impacts on consumer confidence. The organic food sector is highly dependent on eco-
labelling because organic foods in most cases are significantly more expensive that conven-
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tional foods and because it is difficult for individual consumers to verify whether products 
claiming to be organic actually are organically grown. They cannot easily be distinguished 
from conventional foods by appearance and it is difficult for consumers to monitor the pro-
duction process. Hence, labelling of organic foods is an excellent case when exploring the 
impact of state involvement, and there are good reasons to believe that our finding would be 
relevant to other eco-labelling schemes. 
 
Organic labelling systems in four countries 
 
The United States, United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark apply different certification and 
labelling systems. We can distinguish among four different eco-labelling systems which vary 
significantly on three dimensions: the degree of state engagement, the number of certifiers 
and the number of labels. Since 2002, the US certification and labelling system has relied on a 
number of private certifiers, but they must be accredited by the US Department of Agricul-
ture. The certifiers license producers and their certification warrants the use of the USDA or-
ganic label, but other labels may also be used (Agricultural Marketing Service 2003: Subpart 
D). In the UK, the state is also the ‘certifier of the certifiers’ and thus leaves certification and 
labelling to private bodies. But in contrast to the US scheme, no government label exists; each 
certifier has its own label. The Soil Association is the dominant certification body in the UK, 
certifying and labelling over 80% of all organic food being sold in the UK, but there are other 
labels as well (e.g. Organic Growers’ Association and Organic Food Federation). In most 
cases, the private certifiers have stricter and/or additional requirements compared to govern-
ment regulation (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2010). In Sweden the 
non-governmental KRAV label is very dominant, labelling approximate 95% of all food sold 
in Sweden (personal correspondence KRAV, August 2009). KRAV certification and inspec-
tion of producers, processors and retailers is undertaken by four private certification bodies 
(KRAV 2010). KRAV is a state accredited label which complies with EU organic rules, but 
some KRAV’s requirements are stricter than the EU rules. Organic farmers are not required to 
be KRAV certified to receive government subsidies for organic farming as long as they com-
ply with the EU’s rules for organic farming, but KRAV certification is needed to market pro-
duce as organic through commercial sales channels. In Denmark, the state operates the certifi-
cation and labelling system. Imported foods can be labelled with other labels, but the state 
label is practically the sole national organic label and only state-certified farms are allowed to 
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market organically labelled products and receive state support. Imported food labelled with 
foreign labels must comply with the EU’s rules for organic farming (Fødevarestyrelsen 2010). 
 
In sum, the Swedish scheme is run by a government-authorized private certifier, who has ob-
tained near-monopoly status with its own label and requirements. In the UK the situations is 
fairly similar. The Soil Association has been licensed to certify but has not obtained domi-
nance on labelling to the same as extent as KRAV in Sweden. Though the Swedish and UK 
governments control who is authorized to certify, their role in certification is not directly visi-
ble to consumers. In the US government involvement in organic certification is more visible 
because a state label as been established which private certifiers can use. However, the state 
plays the largest role in Denmark, where it has a monopoly on certification and, in practice, 
on labelling. The labelling schemes are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
If heavy state involvement increases consumer confidence we would expect much higher con-
sumer confidence in Denmark compared to the other countries. If, on the other hand, private 
certification attracts confidence, the opposite pattern should be observed. Besides the level of 
involvement, some scholars argue that the number of labels affects consumer confidence. 
Several labels create confusion and uncertainty, which erodes credibility (Hamm and Michel-
sen 1996; Environmental Protection Agency, 1998: 55). If this is the case, the British scheme 
should attract the lowest level of confidence, while the other should be at par. 
 
Research design 
Obviously, other factors besides  labelling scheme  can affect confidence across countries. 
Cross-national differences may not be due to the labelling scheme at all, but instead to coun-
try-level variation in beliefs, attitudes etc. For instance, the Danes and Swedes are among the 
most trusting people in the world (Delhey and Newton 2005; Hudson 2006;  Sønderskov 
2008a) and they have high levels of environmental concern (Inglehart 1995). Thus to establish 
the extent to which state involvement affects consumer confidence, we need to control for 
other relevant factors. We analyse the level of label confidence in the four countries while 
holding a range of relevant alternative explanations constant using survey data from the COP-
survey, a self-administered web survey with participants recruited from standing panels. It 
consists of representative samples (on various demographic parameters) of approximately 
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1,000 respondents from the UK, USA, Denmark, and Sweden and contains measures on con-
fidence in organic labels as well as several possible control variables.
2
 
 
Using these survey data, we regress label confidence on country of residence, while control-
ling for variations in beliefs, attitudes etc. By controlling for these alternate explanations, the 
remaining partial effect of country of residence denotes the differences in confidence that can 
be ascribed to country-level differences in labelling schemes. 
 
In order to estimate the partial level of confidence, all relevant explanations need to be in-
cluded in the analysis. This is not straightforward, as, to our knowledge, no previous studies 
identify the individual level determinants of labelling confidence. This implies that a com-
plete list of relevant explanations does not exist. Instead we will draw on the literature that 
deals with the determinants of trust in general and we will include other obvious explanations 
as well. Four types of explanations are included: social background variables, two forms of 
generalized trust, environmental values and finally level of organic food consumption. 
 
Gender, age, educational level, residential characteristics (rural versus urban), country of ori-
gin (immigrant versus native), and children in household are included as social background 
variables. Gender and age are standard controls and we have no expectations about their ef-
fect.
3
                                                 
2 Only respondents not living with their parents (or grandparents) are sampled to ensure that the respondents 
occasionally shop food. The response rate varies between 39% and 57% across countries. Although this is rather 
low, there is no particular reason to expect sampling bias as non-responders did not know the topic before refus-
ing to participate. The fieldwork was conducted by AC Nielsen and Survey Sampling International in April/May 
2008. The codebook is available upon request 
 We expect that the lower educated and the rural population in general are more sceptical 
about public or private policy schemes which can be denoted centralist or elitist in nature. 
Education has also been found to affect trust in other people (but not always in governmental 
institutions), which also suggests a positive effect of education on confidence (Uslaner 2002: 
Ch. 4-5; Hudson 2006). Likewise, we expect immigrants to have less trust in labels because of 
unfamiliarity with organic food and/or the specific labelling system. Immigrants (and other 
minorities) have also previously been found to have less trust in other people and institutions 
(Uslaner 2002, Ch. 4-5). In regard to children in the household, families with children can be 
3 Income is also a standard social background explanation. However, quite a few respondents did not reveal their 
income (cf. Appendix), which implies that including income will reduce the sample size. We have estimated 
models that include income and its effect is insignificant and does not change the effect of country of residence. 
Moreover, it is not obvious that income should affect confidence. On that basis we do not include income in the 
models reported below.  
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expected to be more concerned about pesticides and health issues than the average consumer, 
implying that they probably are more likely not only to consume more organic food but also 
to have more confidence in organic labelling. Note, however, that these background variables 
do not vary much at the country level (see Appendix). This implies that they probably do not 
explain cross-national variation in confidence, but for the sake of comprehensiveness we in-
clude them in the analysis. 
 
The second type of variables, measures of trust as a generalized phenomenon, certainly vary 
between countries. Several studies have shown that Danes and Swedes are among the most 
trusting people in the world, having high levels of trust in other people and, more importantly, 
in institutions like courts and the government (cf. above). This is also the case in our data (see 
Appendix). This generalized confidence may very well spill over into confidence in labels. 
We include two measures of such generalized confidence: generalized social trust and gener-
alized institutional trust. Generalized social trust is the belief that most people are trustworthy. 
While we do not expect trust in other people to affect trust in labels per se, we include it to 
capture people’s basic propensity to trust and their general level of optimism (Uslaner 2002), 
which very well may affect label confidence. Generalized institutional trust, on the other 
hand, is expected to affect labelling trust directly. It reflects people’s trust in the formal insti-
tutions and rules that regulate their lives. Moreover, generalized institutional trust is strongly 
affected by corruption (Uslaner 2008). Both corruption and low trust in institutions in general 
are very likely to affect trust in eco-labelling schemes. 
 
The third type of variables included is environmental awareness, measured with postmaterial 
value orientation (cf. Inglehart 1997). People who hold green attitudes are probably more 
likely to have positive opinions about eco-labels. 
 
The final variable is a measure of organic food consumption. While the causality most likely 
solely goes from trust to consumption, it could be that heavy consumers of organic food in 
part choose to trust labels to legitimize their decisions (Sønderskov 2009). Previous studies 
show that Danes on average consume far more organic foods than residents in the other coun-
tries (Daugbjerg and Sønderskov 2009; Sønderskov 2009; see also Appendix). To rule out the 
possibility that cross-national differences are caused by differences in consumption, we esti-
mate a model that includes level of consumption as predictor. Details on wording and/or cod-
ing for each independent variable are found in Table 3, and descriptives for all variables are 
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reported in the Appendix. All independent variables, except for age, are scaled from 0 to 1 to 
make it (somewhat) easier to compare effects. 
 
To measure the dependent variable, labelling confidence, the respondents were given the fol-
lowing statement: “You can trust that products marketed as organic actually are organic in the 
majority of cases” and asked to evaluate it on a 5 point Likert scale from “completely dis-
agree” to “completely agree. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Explaining variation in consumer confidence 
The first evidence on the effect of state involvement in organic labelling system is found in 
Table 3, which shows consumer confidence in products claiming to be organic. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Before going into the cross-country differences, it is worth noticing that the level of confi-
dence in organic labels is quite high across the four countries. On average 62% of the respon-
dents agree that organic labels are trustworthy and more than 50% of the respondents express 
confidence in all countries. Apparently, a majority of consumers possess at least one of the 
prerequisites for green consumerism, but there are noteworthy cross-country differences. This 
indicates that some labelling schemes are better than others and that there is room for im-
provements in some countries. Far more people in Denmark agree completely with the state-
ment than people in the other countries. In fact, Danes express a significantly higher degree of 
confidence compared to residents in all the other countries, while Swedes express slightly 
more confidence than the Americans and the British (cf. Model I in Table 4 below). Appar-
ently, the Danish system attracts confidence, which supports a state-centred approach to eco-
labelling; Denmark has by far the largest level of state involvement and also the highest level 
of confidence. 
 
However, before jumping to conclusions and advising policymakers to impose state con-
trolled eco-labelling around the world, two issues must be addressed. First, the picture is not 
crystal clear. The Swedish system comes in second in regard to confidence, and the Swedish 
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labelling scheme, together with the British, is the least state controlled system in our analysis. 
Thus, the superiority of the state labelling system is not clear cut. Second, the cross-national 
differences might not be due to the labelling scheme at all, but rather to country-level varia-
tion in beliefs, attitudes etc. Perhaps, the higher confidence amongst Nordic residents is sim-
ply a result of e.g. higher environmental awareness or generalized trust, while the level of 
state involvement  may  not affect confidence. We address these concerns through further 
analysis of alternate explanations. 
 
The analysis is conducted using an ordered logistic regression because labelling confidence 
only has five ordered categories and therefore cannot be assumed to be metric. The ordered 
logistic regression is superior to OLS in such situations. It treats the observed ordinal variable 
as a manifestation of a continuous, but unobserved, underlying variable. Labelling confidence 
is most likely continuous. Thus, a person’s true level of confidence is unobserved, but it is 
assumed that this level affects her value on the observed ordinal variable. Although superior, 
interpretation is a bit more cumbersome in the ordered model. Sign, t-, and P-values have the 
same meaning as in OLS, and the obtained coefficients also signify the effect of a 1-unit in-
crease in the independent variables on the dependent variable. However, since the scale of the 
dependent variable is unobserved and hence unknown, the interpretation of the size of the co-
efficient is not straightforward. To ease interpretation, the predicted probability of answering 
“agree” or “completely agree” on the observed ordered dependent variable is reported for 
each country in addition to the coefficient. Obviously, the predicted probability is affected by 
the level of the other variables in the model. The calculation of the predicted probability is 
performed by setting the control variables to either their mean or to the most prevailing cate-
gory. 
 
[Tables 4+5 about here] 
 
The results of the analysis are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Model I in Table 4 corresponds to 
Table 3 above as it only includes country of residence. Danish consumers are chosen as refer-
ence since the Danish labelling system is by far the most state-centric. The coefficients and 
their t-values show that Swedish, British and US consumers express significantly lower levels 
of confidence than Danes. The predicted probabilities in the second column tell the same 
story; Danes are much more likely to express confidence. Since Danish consumers are the 
reference category, the results do not show if differences exist between consumers of the other 
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countries. Calculations show that Swedes have significantly more confidence than both the 
British (P < 0.1) and the Americans (P < 0.05). There is no significant difference between 
British and American citizens (cf. notes to Table 4). 
 
The following models include the four types of individual level explanations in sequence (ac-
cording to their presumed causal order) to disclose which, if any, types of explanations ex-
plain the pattern in Model I. Although it is not the main focus of the analysis, this procedure 
also provides information on the determinants of labelling confidence. The social background 
variables are included in Model II. The overall picture does not change much when control-
ling for social background. This was expected because the social background variables do not 
vary much across countries. Danish consumers still have far more confidence than consumers 
in the other countries. However, Swedes are no longer more confident than the British, and 
the Americans have only slightly less confidence than British and Swedes. Apparently, the 
higher level of confidence among Swedes is not caused by the labelling scheme, but rather by 
differences in social background. The predicted probabilities change somewhat in this model, 
but mainly because they are now calculated for a middle-aged native female etc. (cf. values in 
parentheses). 
 
Model III includes the measures of generalized trust. Both institutional and social trust have a 
large impact on confidence. Such generalized trust apparently spills over into trust in specific 
phenomena like eco-labels. The inclusion of the trust measures reduces the differences in con-
fidence between Danes and residents of the other countries, as indicated by the smaller coeffi-
cients. Nevertheless, Danish consumers still exhibit significantly more confidence than those 
of the other countries. Interestingly, after taking differences in generalized forms of trust into 
account, the order of the remaining countries changes. UK consumers have significantly more 
confidence in organic labels than Swedes and Americans when trust is held constant. Again, 
this tells us that the relative success of the Swedish system has nothing to do with the label-
ling system itself, but instead is caused by trusting citizens. We will return to this issue below. 
 
The inclusion of environmental values in Model IV does not change the picture that emerged 
in Model III. Although people with postmaterial values have more confidence in labels, as 
expected, the cross-national pattern does not change. The final model includes self-reported 
level of organic food consumption. As noted above, the direction of causality is most likely or 
predominantly from confidence to consumption, and not the other way as assumed in Model 
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V. Thus, we should not put too much confidence in the exact coefficients from this model. 
Nevertheless, it shows that even if consumption affects confidence, then Danish consumers—
all else being equal—still have significantly higher confidence. Hence, the higher confidence 
in the Danish label is not just an effect of higher consumption. 
 
In sum, the five models substantiate the pattern already found in Table 3, but it also reveals 
interesting new knowledge. Like in Table 3, Danish consumers exhibit a great deal more con-
fidence in organic food labels than consumers in the other countries in all models. Although 
the difference decreases a bit when controlling for individual level explanations, the differ-
ence is highly significant and non-trivial. The predicted probability of expressing confidence 
is no less than 0.1 higher for Danish consumers in any model—and it is higher in most cases. 
This tells us that the higher level of confidence in Denmark is not solely caused by the fact 
that Danes are more trusting in general, nor is it a result of higher levels of environmental 
awareness, but a consequence of the state labelling system. This finding clearly supports the 
position that significant state engagement in eco-labelling has an independent positive effect 
on confidence. 
 
Nevertheless, the evidence in support of a state labelling system is not clear-cut in our analy-
sis. With its state label, the US scheme is slightly more state centred than the British and 
Swedish labelling schemes but Americans do not significantly surpass the Swedes and actu-
ally have less confidence than the British. We can dismiss that this has anything to do with the 
number of labels. According to this explanation, we should expect to find the lowest level of 
confidence in the UK, but this is clearly not the case. There are no indications in our results 
that the number of labels should affect confidence. A more plausible explanation is that the 
US labelling scheme was introduced recently, and that it takes a while before consumers get 
accustomed to a new scheme. This, however, remains a speculation. In spite of the unex-
pected difference between the British and the American citizens, our analysis supports that 
substantial state involvement increases confidence. 
 
In addition to this finding, other interesting findings pop out of the models. By far, the two 
most important additional predictors of label confidence are generalized social trust and espe-
cially generalized institutional trust. Apparently, such generalized forms of trust affect trust in 
specific phenomena. To explore the role of institutional trust further, we have reestimated 
Model IV in each country (omitting the country variables; estimates not shown, available on 
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request). It could be that institutional trust only affects labelling confidence in countries rely-
ing on heavy state involvement. This is not the case, however; the effect of institutional trust 
is highly influential, significant, and about the same in all countries. Hence, people’s percep-
tions of the formal institutions also affect their perception of non-state institutions like label-
ling systems provided by private parties. 
 
Before moving on to discuss the implications of these findings, we will dwell briefly on the 
effects of the other variables. Since this study is the first to explore the individual level deter-
minants of labelling confidence, the results deserve a few comments. Females and younger 
people express more confidence. Education also has some effect, although it disappears in 
Model III and onwards. Most likely, the effect of education is mediated by both types of gen-
eralized trust and environmental values. The urban population is slightly more confident, 
while immigrants do not hold lower confidence (except for in the final, but less valid model). 
People with high levels of environmental awareness hold more confidence, as signified by the 
positive effect of postmaterial values. The same thing goes for people with large consumption 
of organic foods, although the latter result most probably is invalid due to simultaneity bias. 
 
Conclusions 
Green consumerism requires that the consumers can identify true environmentally friendly 
goods, which can be obtained through reliable eco-labelling. This article has investigated the 
optimal role for governments who wish to enhance green consumerism. 
 
Taking labelling of organic foods as our empirical case, the analyses compared the level of 
consumer confidence in existing organic labelling schemes. The analyses showed that sub-
stantial state involvement increases consumer confidence. The results suggest that govern-
ments who wish to promote green consumerism should engage heavily in eco-labelling. Ap-
parently, consumers are more likely to trust labelling schemes where the state plays an active 
and visible role. Although this finding is at odds with the most common presumption and the 
scarce empirical data, the result rests on fairly solid empirical evidence. Our study is the first 
of its kind to use cross-national data which contains measures of confidence in existing 
schemes and the first to control for alternate explanations. 
 
On the other hand, more research is needed before we would advise every government to 
abandon existing private schemes and engage heavily in eco-labelling. Our results rest on data 
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from four countries in one field of eco-labelling. We see no reasons why these findings cannot 
be generalized to other countries and products, but this is obviously an empirical question. 
Moreover, the study cannot predict the consequences of abandoning one type of scheme and 
switching to a state centred scheme. It could take several years before confidence passes its 
pre-existing level. The American scheme, which rests on moderate state involvement, was 
introduced recently, and its unexpected underperformance may indicate that it takes a while 
before state labelling takes effect. Thus more research is needed on the effect of scheme 
changes and on the generalizability of the findings. 
 
Other factors were also found to affect consumer confidence. Citizens who have confidence in 
governmental institutions also have confidence in the labelling scheme. Importantly, this find-
ing also applies to citizens in countries that do not rely on state labelling. This implies that 
countries, where citizens do not trust state institutions, cannot increase labelling confidence 
by relying on non-state labels. Most likely, the low level of institutional trust will affect the 
perception of private labels as well. This suggests that delegation of eco-labelling to private 
bodies is no easy fix to problems of low institutional trust, only the formidable task of im-
proving citizens’ trust in state institutions will do the job. Another pathway to increasing con-
sumer confidence in eco-labelling goes through education and increased  environmental 
awareness. Nor is this an easy fix, but nonetheless a more achievable strategy than attempting 
to increase trust in state institutions.    
 
 
[Appendix here] 
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Table 1: Organic labelling schemes in Sweden, UK, US and Denmark 
  The role of the state 
in certification 
Number of  
certifiers 
Effective  
number of labels 
Level of state  
involvement 
Sweden  Certifies the private 
certifiers, but private 
body has additional 
rules 
1 (KRAV)  1 (KRAV)  Low 
United 
Kingdom 
Certifies the private 
certifiers but private 
bodies has additional 
rules 
Approx 10  
(but Soil As-
sociation 
dominates) 
Approx 10  
(but SA’s label 
dominates) 
Low 
USA  Certifies the private 
certifiers 
Approx 50  State label 
dominates 
Low-medium 
Denmark  Certifies producers 
directly 
1 (state)  1 (state)  Very high 
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Table 2. Measurement of the independent variables 
Notes: See the appendix for descriptives. *: The categories are the same as in the General Social Sur-
vey (US), European Social Survey (DK+SE), and European Values Study (UK); **:  The wording var-
ies between countries but is equivalent; The codebook is available on request. 
Variable  Details 
Country of Residence  Denmark, Sweden, UK, USA,  
Gender  Dummy variable; 1=female 
Age  Age in years 
Education  Originally 9-12 ordered categories depending on country*; Rescaled 0-1; 
1=Highly educated 
Residential area  Dummy; 1=respondent is living in a city of more than 50,000 inhabitants 
Country of origin  Dummy; 1=Native 
Children in household  Dummy; 1=one or more children (under age 20) living in household 
Generalized institutional trust Scale based on five items: “How much do you personally trust each of the follow-
ing institutions?: The legal system, Congress**, The police, The civil services, 
The government” All answers on 11-point scales; The final scale is rescaled from 
0-1; 1= high trust. Cronbach’s alpha=0.90 
Generalized social trust  Scale based on three items: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”; “Do you 
think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, 
or would they try to be fair?”; “Would you say that most of the time people try to 
be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?”.  All answers on 
11-point scales.  The final scale is rescaled from 0-1; 1= high trust. Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.84 
Environmental values  Three categories: Materialist, mixed, postmaterialist. Based on the four item 
postmaterialism battery (Inglehart 1997: Ch. 4); Postmaterialist=strong environ-
mental values 
Organic consumption  Index based on three items: “Think about your shopping in the past six months: 
How large a share of your consumption has been organic within the following 
food groups? Dairy products; Fruit and vegetables; Meat”. All answers on 5 point 
scales. The final index is rescaled from 0-1; 1= high consumption. 
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Table 3. Trust in organic food labelling in Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, and USA  
Source: COP survey. 
 
You can trust that products marketed as 
organic actually are organic in the major-
ity of cases 
Denmark  Sweden  UK  US  Total 
% 
Completely disagree  2.0  3.7  4.5  5.0  3.8 
Disagree  7.9  17.9  15.9  17.4  14.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  8.5  20.0  25.2  23.3  19.2 
Agree  45.9  43.7  43.2  45.1  44.5 
Completely agree  35.7  14.7  11.2  9.3  17.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
N  973  971  985  929  3,858 
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Table 4. Predicting label confidence (ordered logit model) 
Notes: b= logit coefficient (t-values in parentheses); P agree/compl. agree: Predicted probability of 
answering “agree” or “completely agree” in each country holding other variables at the value specified 
in parentheses.*, **, ***: P < 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 (two-sided). The coefficient for Sweden is significantly 
higher than UK (P < 0.1) and US (P < 0.05) in Model I; The coefficient is significantly lower for US 
than Sweden and UK (P < 0.1) in Model II; The coefficient for UK is significantly higher than US (P 
< 0.05) and Sweden (P < 0.01) in Model III. 
  Model I    Model II    Model III 
  Coefficient 
(b) 
P agree/ compl. 
agree 
  Coefficient 
(b) 
P agree/ 
compl. agree 
  Coefficient 
(b) 
P agree/ 
compl. agree 
Country of residence               
  Denmark  Reference  0.83    Reference  0.85    Reference  0.80 
  Sweden  -1.20*** 
(-13.68) 
0.59    -1.28*** 
(-14.29) 
0.62    -0.88*** 
(-9.44) 
0.63 
  UK  -1.35*** 
(-15.43) 
0.55    -1.27*** 
(-14.04) 
0.62    -0.65*** 
(-6.53) 
0.68 
  USA  -1.41*** 
(-15.96) 
0.54    -1.43*** 
(-15.70) 
0.58    -0.85*** 
(-8.62) 
0.63 
Gender (female)        0.29*** 
(4.71) 
(female)    0.27*** 
(4.42) 
(female) 
Age        -0.02*** 
(-7.48) 
(45)    -0.02*** 
(9.46) 
(45) 
Education        0.29** 
(2.50) 
(0.66)    0.00 
(0.17) 
(0.66) 
Residential area 
(town/city) 
    0.15* 
(2.25) 
(town/ 
city) 
  0.11* 
(1.66) 
(town/ 
city) 
Country of origin 
(Native) 
      0.09 
(0.72) 
(yes)    0.14 
(1.04) 
(yes) 
Children in house-
hold (yes) 
      0.04 
(0.63) 
(no)    0.01 
(0.17) 
(no) 
Generalized 
institutional trust 
          1.79*** 
(9.75) 
(0.53) 
Generalized 
social trust 
            1.28*** 
(7.12) 
(0.58) 
N    3,858      3,701      3,677 
McKelvey & Zavoina's R
2     0.09      0.12      0.18 
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Table 5. Predicting label confidence (ordered logit model) 
  Model IV    Model V 
  Coefficient 
(b) 
P agree/ 
compl. agree 
 
 
Coefficient 
(b) 
P agree/ compl. 
agree 
Country of residence         
  Denmark  Reference  0.80    Reference  0.77 
  Sweden  -0.88*** 
(-9.24) 
0.62   
 
-0.78*** 
(-8.01) 
0.61 
  UK  -0.68*** 
(-5.69) 
0.68   
 
-0.49*** 
(-4.60) 
0.67 
  USA  -0.79*** 
(-7.73) 
0.64   
 
-0.66*** 
(-6.09) 
0.64 
Gender (female)  0.29*** 
(4.56) 
(female)   
 
0.28*** 
(4.42) 
(female) 
Age  -0.02*** 
(-9.58) 
(45)   
 
-0.03*** 
(9.84) 
(45) 
Educational level  -0.24 
(0,34) 
(0.66)   
 
-0.12 
(-0.82) 
(0.66) 
Residential area 
(town/city) 
0.11* 
(1.68) 
(town/city)   
 
0.07 
(1.05) 
(town/city) 
Native to country (yes)  0.16 
(1.20) 
(yes)   
 
0.28** 
(2.04) 
(yes) 
Children living at home 
(yes) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
(no)   
 
0.01 
(0.16) 
(no) 
Generalized 
institutional trust 
1.85*** 
(9.91) 
(0.53)   
 
1.89*** 
(9.66) 
(0.53) 
Generalized 
social trust 
1.21*** 
(6.61) 
(0.58)   
 
1.16*** 
(6.09) 
(0.58) 
Environmental values    (Mixed)      (Mixed) 
  Materialist  Reference      Reference   
  Mixed  0.09 
(1.28) 
   
 
0.05 
(0.70) 
 
  Postmaterialist  0.46*** 
(3.96) 
   
 
0.32*** 
(2.64) 
 
Organic consumption       
 
1.28*** 
(10.92) 
(0.29) 
N    3,604      3,353 
McKelvey & Zavoina's R
2  0.18      0.21 
Notes: b=logit coefficient (t-values in parentheses); P agree/compl. agree: Pre-
dicted probability of answering “agree” or “completely agree” in each country 
holding other variables at the value specified in parentheses.*, **, ***: P < 0.1, 
0.05, 0.01 (two-sided); The coefficient for UK is significantly higher than Swe-
den and US (P < 0.01) in Model IV; The coefficient is significantly higher for 
UK than US (P < 0.1) and Sweden (P < 0.01) in Model V.
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Appendix: Descriptives for independent variables, total and by country  
  Share/Mean 
  Total  Denmark  Sweden  UK  US 
Gender (female)  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.51  0.52 
Age  45  45  43  46  46 
Educational level  0.63  0.63  0.69  0.62  0.75 
Residential area (town/city)  0.68  0.69  0.76  0.63  0.65 
Native to country (yes)  0.94  0.96  0.94  0.91  0.93 
Children living at home (yes)  0.39  0.37  0.42  0.37  0.39 
Generalized institutional trust  0.53  0.68  0.51  0.42  0.47 
Generalized social trust  0.58  0.68  0.59  0.51  0.52 
Environmental values           
  Materialist  0.32  0.18  0.16  0.47  0.51 
  Mixed  0.57  0.69  0.68  0.47  0.43 
  Postmaterialist  0.11  0.13  0.16  0.06  0.06 
Organic consumption  0.29  0.35  0.27  0.26  0.26 
Source: COP survey 
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